The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (Pulitzer Prize Finalist) Paperback – July 15, 2014

The Blood Telegram is the kind of superbly researched and written history that appears once in a decade. It is based on massive archival research and on Nixon's White House tapes, as well as interviews with a large cast of persons directly involved. The author documents the flow of events faithfully and accurately. HIs special focus is on Nixon and Kissinger, the American leaders who shaped and guided the United States' response to the unfolding political, humanitarian and finally military crisis in East Pakistan during 1971.How could the United States enable a genocide and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis? Why did Nixon and Kissinger disregard and punish U.S. Foreign Service Officers who reported the facts about the Pakistan army's slaughter of Bengali academics, university students and ultimately hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children? Why did Nixon like and admire the Pakistani military dictator, Yahya Khan, and despise Indira Gandhi, the elected leader of the world's largest democracy? Why did Nixon and Kissinger, however briefly, exercise brinkmanship that could have led to a major US-Soviet confrontation, even a wider war?I believe the answers to these questions reside in Nixon and Kissinger as leaders who responded almost entirely in terms of the geopolitical paradigm of the Cold War. Throughout, Nixon saw Pakistan as an ally that could not be undercut, or even influenced, for such steps would show weakness in the hoped-for opening to China, and confer advantage to the Soviet Union. The genocide was categorized as an 'internal affair' of Pakistan--even though there had been ample opportunity to use U.S. pressure to alleviate and possibly even prevent it.I personally experienced the events of the Blood Telegram as a member of the U.S. Agency for International Development mission, stationed at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi 1970-1972. As the crisis grew, I read the classified cable message traffic every morning, closely read all available U.S. and Indian press coverage, and discussed the situation with Embassy and USAID colleagues, many of whom were managing refugee relief programs. From that experience, I can add to the book's narrative about the U.S. Consulate General's reporting from Dacca, East Pakistan's capital.After Archer Blood was fired at Nixon's direction, his successor as Consul General was Herbert Spivack, expected to be a 'team player' in downplaying the extent of the on-going Pak army crackdown. Spivack came through New Delhi on his way to Dacca, to be briefed on how the rising tide of refugees was impacting eastern India and on U.S. food assistance to the camps. It was clear from his comments to the Delhi Americans that he understood his intended role. But, to his great credit as a Foreign Service professional, Herb Spivack's reporting from Dacca shortly after his arrival became substantively the same as that of Arch Blood's. But Kissinger couldn't very well fire him too!As seems apparent from his contemptuous and hateful comments ("What India needs is a good famine") recorded from the Oval Office, Nixon had no conception of India as a sovereign nation responding to a unique set of regional circumstances. Throughout, India's role was seen only as an extension of the Cold War chess game, as if India were merely a pawn of the Soviets. Nixon and Kissinger's cynical dismissal of the plight of the refugees--a human tide of ten million people that would have overwhelmed the capacity of even a rich nation to feed and care for--was simply sickening to 'hear' from the mouths of supposedly decent men.In fact, the emergence of Bangladesh had deep roots in regional history that had nothing to do with the Cold War. The salient aspects were the 1947 partition of British India, and the critical role played by east Bengal's mainly Muslim population in securing the very existence of Pakistan; the effort by the western part to suppress the Bengali language (spoken by a majority of the citizens of the country) in favor of Urdu; the decades-long transfer of resources from the east to finance the industrialization of the western province; and finally, the racial and religious prejudice of the western province's Punjabis and Pathans against 'the Bingos.' (Earnest prayers were offered in Karachi mosques that the Bengalis should become good Muslims!).Autonomy for East Pakistan within a federal framework, or even independence as Bangladesh, could hardly change the power calculus of the Cold War. And from their recorded comments, it appears that both Nixon and Kissinger, on some level, understood this. The real U.S. interest was in West Pakistan, holder of the nation's key asset--control of the Khyber Pass and access to Afghanistan. But this did not stop Kissinger from pulling his last petulant prank--sending the U.S.S. Enterprise, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, into the Bay of Bengal to threaten and harrass the Indians into a premature cease-fire. This move accomplished nothing except to poison U.S.-India relations for a decade.

This is a fascinating book written about a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions thate occurred less than half a century ago and was the closest the world got to witnessing another Holocaust, quite inexplicably though, the world has chosen to forget about it. That event of course, was the genocide of Bengalis in East Pakistan by the West Pakistani army. The author deftly traces the evolution of the conflict, which started when the military strongman of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, refused to transfer power to the democratically elected leader of the Awami League, Mujibur Rehman. The grievances of the people of the East then bubbled over and Yahya subsequently unleashed a terrible repression which then assumed proportions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. However, these events form only a background to this book because the main intention of the author is to show the cynical manner in which the superpower of the world, the United States, led by Nixon and Kissinger refused to do anything to force Yahya to cease the massacres taking place in the East. A curious mix of reasons, ranging from Nixon's personal affinity for the dimwitted Yahya to his intense almost racist dislike for the Indians led the President and his security advisor to become the most vocal advocates for the genocidal Pakistani army outside of Islamabad. Nixon and Kissinger certainly knew what was happening, their own diplomats in Dhaka gave them daily updates of the wanton massacres being perpetrated in the streets and legions of correspondents visited the refugees streaming out of Bangladesh into India and highlighted growing tales of torture and human rights violations. However the White House remained obstinate, blaming bleeding heart liberals for being overly concerned about a few pitiable brown Muslims. Even when the Dhaka consulate staffers, unable to remain silent at the carnage around them sent a strongly worded dissent telegram to the White House condemning American silence, the only response of the American government was to punish those who chose to speak up. Archer Blood, whose name prefaces the telegram, paid a heavy price, his career taking a hit and he could never achieve his cherished ambition of being an ambassador. Nixon and Kissinger however, continued their bullheaded policy and turned a blind eye to the killings and the use of American arms for the massacre of the civilian population. In what must surely be the lowest point of the American nation, even worse than My Lai, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to willingly and knowingly break the law to provide more arms to Pakistan in defiance of the Senate embargo. The only aim the two had was to ensure that Pakistan, an American ally should not be completely routed by India, which was receiving Soviet help. The author also shows how the widening of the war was inevitable, with 10 million refugees pouring into India and overwhelming the resources of the border states. The ethnic composition of the refugees was 90% Hindu, adding a further dangerous element to the tinderbox in India. The author highlights that Indian intervention in Bangladesh was not on purely humanitarian grounds however, he does credit India with not closing its borders to the stream of human misery pouring into its territory. Similarly, he excoriates Nixon and Kissinger but does give them credit where due by highlighting that American aid to the refugees was comfortably more than that provided by any other nation, even though it was not even a tenth of what was required. However at the end of it all, no one who reads this book can come out with any feeling other than deep revulsion for Nixon and Kissinger who come across as callous and inhuman in their indifference to an unparalleled human tragedy. The most depressing aspect of the whole affair is that far from being held accountable or even condemned for their actions, the East Pakistan affair seems to have had little resonance in the popular assessment of Nixon and Kissinger, in particular the latter has somewhat successfully salvaged his legacy from the disaster that was the East Pakistan affair by refusing to discuss it in any book or forum and letting time wipe out public memory. In that regard, this book is a much needed reckoning for Nixon and Kissinger and the author has to be lauded for achieving the objective of building a well researched case against them. The only weak points of the book are the limited voices from Pakistan and Bangladesh about the events of the time, it is quite strange that the two central parties to the conflict be reduced to mere spectators in the book. Other than that, this is a fine example of a well researched and even handed treatment of history, warts and all

Book was essentially new and you are supporting a non-profit. Highly recommend!