Presidents and Their Generals: An American History of Command in War

Mr. Moten's book is a valuable work for both the expert and the casual reader. Well written, it covers the history of the US Presidential/military relationship by focusing on a series of episodes, primarily major American wars from the revolution through the most recent Iraq war. Even though some of the material will be familiar to veteran readers in the field, Mr. Moten manages to put new twists on old stories. He does not rely on conventional wisdom.Still, there are places where he could have been a bit more unconventional. He rightly, I think, decries the tendency of the JCS since the 1950s to be Administration yes men and he also indicates, in damning detail, just how long Harry Truman wrongly tolerated Douglas MacArthur's insubordination. But he presents Truman's ultimate firing as a triumph of civilian control of the military. It was not. Truman only mildly chided MacArthur's insubordinate statements to the press, but, always the partisan politician, he fired him for the one thing MacArthur did that he was supposed to do: express his views to a Congressman who requested them. Granted, Congressman Martin misused the information, but the military takes an oath to support the Constitution, not the Commander-in-Chief, and that includes being frank to Congress. By punishing a military man for responding to a question from Congress, Truman set the stage for the emasculated JCS we saw in the 1960s, where, as HR McMaster shows in painful detail, Robert McNamara would blatantly lie about JCS advice and they did nothing to fix the record. MacArthur's firing led inevitably to an emasculated military.Similarly, Mr. Moten is too harsh on LBJ's advisors. Once we supported the coup which destabilized the entire region, there was no viable alternative than to act as we did. Even before JFK was killed, Cambodia, citing US support of the coup, broke its alliance with the US and declared non-aligned status. If we hadn't moved to prop up our puppets, we would have been distrusted throughout the Third World.Finally, while Mr. Moten is very effective at damning the flaws of the planning of the Iraq War in 2003 and, unlike other critics, acknowledges that it is demonstrable fact that at one time, Saddam had Weapons of Mass Destruction (and, frankly, anyone who listened to Secretary Powell's evidence at the UN should have realized that we'd never find the WMDs), he should have acknowledged that Saddam funded, equipped and trained nearly all the terrorist groups in existence in 2003. Iraq was both a legitimate target in the "War on Terror" and its defeat was effective (a lot fewer school buses full of Israeli school children and US embassies have been destroyed since Saddam fell). A 1600 page report documenting that was published by the Pentagon in 2008, but most commentators have just ignored it. Mr. Moten is far too honest an historian to do so.But these are all minor blemishes compared to the virtues of the book and the way the book has of making the reader reexamine many of the assumptions he had about historical figures: Alexander Hamilton's attempted power grab during the Quasi War against France, Winfield Scott's efforts to fulfill the policies of an antagonistic President Polk, General Grant's instinctive grasp of the balance between the political sphere and the military sphere, Woodrow Wilson's complete abdication of leadership during World War I, Harry Hopkins crucial role in smoothing the differences between George Marshall and FDR, Maxwell Taylor's marginalization of the JCS (they were barely consulted during the Missile Crisis and the decisions that led us to Vietnam were largely Taylor's), Colin Powell's skillful efforts to bring the military viewpoint back into the policy debate and Donald Rumsfeld's efforts to shove them out again.Time and again, Mr. Moten makes the reader revisit the familiar and forces him to look at it with fresh eyes. That s a signal achievement.

This historical assessment of interactions between Commanders in Chief and the Generals assigned to complement civil authority by strategic insights and execution is detailed and insightful. I can't help but believe it is, or will be, on the required reading lists at the Army War College and the National Defense University. The range of personal and official relationships are captured in detail and their impact on key moments in National history is clear. Meaningful history indeed. Thanks for offering this book in the Kindle library.

Well written and easy reading. A great representation/ explanation of great civil/ military relationships. Suggested reading for those interested in military or political careers or history.

Excellent treatment of an important subject. The author writes well and ably places the key figures in their contexts. My favorite sections had to do with Congress/Washington, Lincoln/McClellan, and Roosevelt/Marshall. Highly recommended.

Excellent book -well researched but very readable with lots of interesting information.

GREAT BACKGROUND INFO

Author Matthew Moten, a former head of the History Department at West Point, undertakes a thoughtful and considered review of the relationship between the Executive Branch and the US Military throughout the history of the United States, from the time of George Washington to the present. Moten explores the concept of civilian control of the military in all of its facets: what the relationship should look like in theory, how the relationship has evolved over time, times when the concept has operated effectively, and times when it has not. The product is a well articulated and well reasoned treatise that is informative, that seeks to educate the reader, and that is a pleasure to read for anyone with an interest in US history.Moten takes as an ideal, the example of George Washington who, following the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, resisted the temptation of becoming a dictator and submitted control of the military to the elected representatives of the people. In the first section of the book, "Setting Precedents", he explores the challenging relationship between Washington and the Continental Congress in which sectional interests were forced to give way to national ones to bring about the collective defense of the nation. He next explores John Adams' attempts to address the need for and control of a standing army, James Madison effort to wage war in the nation's infancy, James K. Polk's difficult relationship with his generals, stemming from the collision of military and political goals, and Lincoln's efforts at finding the right general to lead the Union war effort.In the next section, entitled "The Politics of Collaboration", Moten looks at examples of when Presidents and their generals were able to strike a reasonable balance between civilian control of policy and military control of the conduct of its operations. He explores the relationships between Lincoln and Grant (in one of the book's best chapters), Woodrow Wilson and John Pershing, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and George Marshall. The last-mentioned chapter is especially informative in explaining the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution.The final section of the book, entitled"The Perils of Partisanship", explores more recent relationships in which an imbalance has had adverse consequences for the nation. These include Harry Truman confronting the arrogance of General Douglas MacArthur, the minimization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of the political goals of Lyndon Johnson and the power of Maxwell Taylor during the Vietnam War, the acquisition of disproportionate influence on the part of Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld's refusal to tolerate dissenting opinions from military advisors in favor of those that matched his own opinions during the second Iraq War.Moten concludes with a considered analysis of the proper relationship between a President and his military advisors. He describes what he considers to be the ideal balance between the executive and the military (comparing it to the captain of a ship and his crew), adapting revered theories into modern times, and he makes some excellent proposals for reform which include replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a National Military Council that is not beholden to its own branch of the service, but rather to the interests of the nation as a whole. He also makes a convincing case as to why retired generals should refrain from choosing sides in subsequent political contests unless they themselves are candidates. His conclusions draw from the lessons of history and are difficult to take issue with, in light of those lessons.This is an excellent book that looks at both the trees and the forest that is civilian control of the military. It is a book that I had hoped someone would write, and it is written better than I had hoped. This book is very insightful and intelligent and is highly recommended for fellow history geeks.

Author Matthew Moten, a former head of the History Department at West Point, undertakes a thoughtful and considered review of the relationship between the Executive Branch and the US Military throughout the history of the United States, from the time of George Washington to the present. Moten explores the concept of civilian control of the military in all of its facets: what the relationship should look like in theory, how the relationship has evolved over time, times when the concept has operated effectively, and times when it has not. The product is a well articulated and well reasoned treatise that is informative, that seeks to educate the reader, and that is a pleasure to read for anyone with an interest in US history.Moten takes as an ideal, the example of George Washington who, following the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, resisted the temptation of becoming a dictator and submitted control of the military to the elected representatives of the people. In the first section of the book, "Setting Precedents", he explores the challenging relationship between Washington and the Continental Congress in which sectional interests were forced to give way to national ones to bring about the collective defense of the nation. He next explores John Adams' attempts to address the need for and control of a standing army, James Madison effort to wage war in the nation's infancy, James K. Polk's difficult relationship with his generals, stemming from the collision of military and political goals, and Lincoln's efforts at finding the right general to lead the Union war effort.In the next section, entitled "The Politics of Collaboration", Moten looks at examples of when Presidents and their generals were able to strike a reasonable balance between civilian control of policy and military control of the conduct of its operations. He explores the relationships between Lincoln and Grant (in one of the book's best chapters), Woodrow Wilson and John Pershing, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and George Marshall. The last-mentioned chapter is especially informative in explaining the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an institution.The final section of the book, entitled"The Perils of Partisanship", explores more recent relationships in which an imbalance has had adverse consequences for the nation. These include Harry Truman confronting the arrogance of General Douglas MacArthur, the minimization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of the political goals of Lyndon Johnson and the power of Maxwell Taylor during the Vietnam War, the acquisition of disproportionate influence on the part of Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld's refusal to tolerate dissenting opinions from military advisors in favor of those that matched his own opinions during the second Iraq War.Moten concludes with a considered analysis of the proper relationship between a President and his military advisors. He describes what he considers to be the ideal balance between the executive and the military (comparing it to the captain of a ship and his crew), adapting revered theories into modern times, and he makes some excellent proposals for reform which include replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a National Military Council that is not beholden to its own branch of the service, but rather to the interests of the nation as a whole. He also makes a convincing case as to why retired generals should refrain from choosing sides in subsequent political contests unless they themselves are candidates. His conclusions draw from the lessons of history and are difficult to take issue with, in light of those lessons.This is an excellent book that looks at both the trees and the forest that is civilian control of the military. It is a book that I had hoped someone would write, and it is written better than I had hoped. This book is very insightful and intelligent and is highly recommended for fellow history geeks.