The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn: A Military and Timing Analysis of the Battle

Having visited the battlefield numerous times, read most the source material as well as numerous histories on this subject I am always disappointed in the end in my hope that perhaps things at the Little Bighorn would turn out differently. Alas, my hopes are always dashed at Last Stand Hill. This latest effort to have Custer explain himself unfortunately falls well short in spite of what I am sure was a significant but myopic effort on the part of Mr. Wagner.The book has numerous short comings that are too many in number to detail here so I will limit my comments to the most troubling:First, Mr. Wagner’s lack of training as a historian is evident in his choice of the first person plural for the narrative. The reader initially refers back to the cover thinking perhaps the “we” is a coauthor until one realizes that the intent is really to co-opt the reader into sharing his opinions. “We” apparently refers to Mr. Wagner and the reader.Secondly, the author feigns objectivity and impartiality quoting Barbara Tuchman (“It is wiser, I believe to arrive at theory by way of the evidence rather the other way around, like so many revisionist today.”) then proceeds to pick and chose his facts in support of his conclusions. He claims to respect the opinions of others then wastes no time describing those opinions as “specious and fatuous” or “This constant business about Custer’s biggest mistake being dividing his command shows a lack of military understanding, a lack of understanding of the conditions Custer faced….” In an example of selective fact picking he launches into a shrill attack on Custer’s decision not to scout Tullocks Creek stating: “its a clear-cut act of flouting Terry’s orders: clear-cut; no discussion, no excuses, no nothing. Custer disobeyed his orders.” In making such a definitive statement he neglects to inform the reader that the affidavit of Mary Adams, who accompanied Custer as a cook stated that General Terry met with Custer just prior to his departure on June 22 and told Custer “Use your own judgement and do what you think is best if you strike the trail…” An impartial writer would have shared this fact with the reader and allowed the reader to judge whether Custer disobeyed orders.Finally, the author’s insistence on divorcing personalities and behaviors from events and treating what happened as a military operation circumscribed by a timeline in which the soldiers all behaved like automatons in and of itself limits the usefulness of the book and dashes the readers hopes of a better understanding of events that led to Last Stand Hill. The author seems to forget that emotions and behaviors inform decisions - even military decisions.So unless you are a tireless reader of all the minutiae surrounding the events that happened in Montana in the summer of 1876 I would recommend lighter more digestible and balanced fare from authors like Utley, Philbrick, Donovan and others.ADDENDUM: Since writing my review of this book I have been subjected to a series of highly partisan and personally insulting comments. Some of these individuals are clearly friends of the author and in one case I suspect the author himself. Interestingly some are also the authors of the 5 star reviews - the same reviews that misled me into purchasing this book in the first place. These responses to my review all seem to follow a predictable pattern: 1) I have a personal animus against the author; 2) I am not qualified to comment on the author’s work (of course I am sure they would make an exception if I was willing to give it 5 stars), and; 3) I must not have read and comprehended the book because I don’t know what I am talking about. So to further expand on my review and spare the reader the tedium of reading through each comment and my response herewith is my retort to the latest Frederick Wagner partisan which pretty well sums up my personal reaction to this book:Mr. Stevenson, since you are so well acquainted with Mr. Wagner’s work and expertise I will assume you are another one of his “Bighorn buddies” as are most of the others who have posted their “comments” to my review. Apparently the reaction of you and the rest of this clique is if you don’t feel Mr. Wagner is the greatest writer of all time and deserving of a 5 star review then you need to be bullied into silence and told how you just don’t understand how impressive Mr. Wagner’s contribution is to the future of our understanding of the Little Bighorn. As for your statement that I harbor some personal animosity (or grudge as another commentator put it) is not possible since I don’t know Mr. Wagner nor any of the individuals who have gone out of their way to attack me personally, tell me what I am supposed to know and not know, and what literature I prefer. (On that subject I note that your comments follow in the same vein as some of the others so I have to assume that perhaps Mr. Wagner or one of his partisans have provided “attack points” that are to be followed in disparaging my review.)On the subject of my review, you will note that I did not criticize the author’s methodology, his timelines, how he developed his timelines, etc. Instead I felt his style was inappropriate, and most objectionable of all was his pretext to objectivity while sparing no pains in criticizing the opinions of others or neglecting facts and statements (intentionally or unintentionally) that did nor support his conclusions. A better author would have laid out all the facts for the reader then clearly stated something like “it’s the authors opinion….” instead of launching into shrill statements of why he’s right and everyone else is wrong.My reading recommendations to other readers who are not interested in the fine details of the battle are just that - an honest recommendation to people who are more interested in a good story and an overview than the maneuverings of 19th century cavalry or discussions of other remote details. Personally, and as I stated in my review, I have read most of the original source material and toured the battlefield more than once. Additionally, I have visited every publicly accessible battlefield Custer ever fought on, fired the major weapons used by both sides, and read all the primary source material related to his life and career, so I have more than a passing familiarity with the subject. You will note that I did not express any opinions regarding my interpretation of the events, nor agree or disagree with any opinions expressed by Mr. Wagner. Nor did I question Mr. Wagner’s qualifications as a commodities trader and amateur historian to write a book or express his opinions as you have in my case. My opinion of the book is based on his style and pretext to impartiality. In a way your comments and those of the others who have chosen to disparage me confirm that lack of impartiality - individuals so blinded by bias that they refuse to accept any possibility this book is not flawless. Ironically this reminds me of the officers in Custer’s royal court whose role was to remind the General of what a great indian fighter and general he was - and woe be to anyone who questioned him.

Fred Wagner has done a masterful job of separating out reality from fiction in his examination of the Battle of the Little Bighorn. His timeline of soldier movements places events in proper perspective and is in all likelihood the most accurate we will see—it is certainly the most detailed—and it fits with one of his prerequisites, that one must fit theory into context, and not vice versa. The title, Strategy of Defeat, encapsulates the theme. Custer must be judged on what he tried to accomplish in a military operation, not on personality clashes or conspiracy theories. Certainly mistakes were made, but there was no stupidity or glory-seeking involved. The notion of villains, cowards, drunks, incompetents, and secret cover-ups has no place in any rational discussion. Custer was a gambler and risk-taker, but such was necessary for a successful cavalry officer. Being trapped in the conceptual framework shared by the army and the nation led to an under-estimation of the foe, an over-estimation of Custer’s and his regiment’s capabilities, and a fatal assumption that Indians would never stand up to the cavalry, but would run and scatter. Wagner finds that Custer’s miscalculations did contribute to the outcome, but the real Strategy of Defeat emanated perhaps more from an endemic flaw in America’s character and conception of warfare, than it did from a single commander.Using quantification as a methodological tool in history had its origins in the Enlightenment, when Deist views of the universe tried to explain all events in the framework of the intricate workings of a clock. It gained in acceptance in the 1950s and 1960s and for a time, quantitative approaches seemed poised to revolutionize history—at least until postmodernism’s rise with the contrary idea that all history was personal, singular, and only relevant to the one doing the telling. Despite the fact that the approach remains indispensable for answering certain kinds of historical questions, it does tend to downplay the unquantifiable factors that can greatly influence historical outcomes. Regardless, in some instances such as the Little Bighorn episode, the timeline-type quantifications seem essential.There are a number of incisive comments that will spark controversy: the fact that Custer did disobey Terry’s order to inspect Tullock’s Creek, very likely because at the time of the approach he already had decided to attack the Indians, with or without Terry. The discussion as to whether Custer listened to his scouts to attack the village, to wait, or to never attack, opens up new possibilities for consideration, as does the contention that Custer never intended to attack the village from the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee, that Reno’s line in the timber was indefensible, or that even after dividing the command beyond the point of no return, Custer was still on the offensive, seeking a solution to a rapidly deteriorating situation.It is said that generals do not make great battles as much as great battles make generals. In either case, unexpected circumstances have a way of obliterating the best laid plans, and wrong assumptions can prove fatal. By debunking personality issues, by eliminating the interminable minutia arguments of weaponry and equipment, and keeping to a strict framework of what was possible and what was not possible, Wagner has set a standard that future students may want to emulate.

This is an excellent book, a concise accurate guide to the battle. The timelines are exceptionally strong, the text is well laid out it reads well, and it delivers a dependable account of what is a very complex sequence of events.I would not claim any expertise on this well-known battle and I bought this book to clarify questions I have and did so on the advice of folks who have found this book useful.The diagrams at first glance are not particularly clear but this given the excellent text become more informative, photos given the paper are a little unclear but this cannot be helped.One of the problems in understanding the battlefield is the nature of the ground and the distances involved this book does explain this.A very good book and well worth the price.The only downside was the long delivery timescale which I suppose can't be helped as it is a book which outside of the US is rather hard to find.

thanks

Un travail d'analyse sérieux fait par un militaire, officier et vétéran du Vietnam. Ca change des historiens ou des "battle students" variables aux analyses "variées".La valeur de l'analyse tient dans dans ce qu'elle prend en compte les données archéologiques, tactiques, humaines et -innovation- les "time line" fondées sur les vitesses de mouvement tactique de la cavalerie et des unités à pied (qu'on retrouve dans les Kriegspiel prussiens ou les manuel d'officiers d'Etat Major).Tout part de là : les vitesses de déplacement militaire (et pas civil, complètement différentes car prise en compte du temps de réaction, de l'effet accordéon, etc.) : en fonction de ces vitesses et témoignages , on dispose d'une chronologie réaliste et non fantaisiste.Les cartes sont précises et circonstanciées en fonction des chapitres abordés. Quelques rares photos de l'auteur aussi.Les témoignages indiens et militaires parsèment le récit dans leur unité mais aussi dans leurs contradictions.On sent que l'auteur cherche la vérité sans l'asséner et choisit souvent de laisser dans l'ombre ce qui reste douteux, tout en affirmant ce dont il est sûr. Il connait les armes, leurs manipulations, les formations de combat, le commandement : ça se sent et ça se lit. Un exemple : le temps de déchargement et de rechargement du Colt réglementaire... Faut l'avoir pratiqué pour le connaître.Des annexes pertinentes pour se faire un avis.L'auteur s'est rendu sur place et a étudié le terrain d'un point de vue militaire.Je ne vais pas vous dévoiler ses conclusions mais elles sont cohérentes et conformes à tout ce que l'on sait en 2014. Evidemment, il fait un sort à la théorie conspirationiste. L'auteur n'est pas un romancier.Malgré tout, une fin attendue :Selon lui, à 16h40, tout est fini pour les unités sous le commandement direct de Custer dans un désordre hurlant noyé sous la poussière. De loin, sur Weir Point, les officiers ont du mal à cerner la situation. Qui combat qui ? Où est Custer ? Qui dirige ce qui semble un combat d'arrière-garde ? Une seule certitude : les indiens sont offensifs, réactifs, nombreux et bien armés et..... que faire alors que le soir s'approche ?Au même moment le reste, sous le "commandement balbutiant" de Reno, les 3 compagnies étrillées dans la vallée, les 2 compagnies de Benteen et la compagnie attachée au Train Pack, finissent de se mettre en position autour de Weir Point. Les indiens s'approchant, tous retraitent vers le secteur de Reno, seul viable immédiatement pour la défense. Ce qui sera fait à 17h30.Bilan de l'auteur :Qui est blamable ? Au point de vue militaire, ni Reno, ni Benteen. Seul le chef est blâmable même si la situation s'est présentée à lui de manière exceptionnelle et qu'il en a été victime. Le reste, vous le lirez vous même.Point négatif : ouvrage en anglais mais se lit assez bien et de toute façon, il n'y a pas d'équivalent en français, aussi pointu.Point négatif bis : ouvrage plutôt pointu pour spécialistes. J'ai peur que le néophyte se perde dans les détails. Il s'agit plus d'une étude que le récit de la bataille.Point négatif ter : l'analyse se concentre sur la bataille menée par Custer. Le siège, l'arrivée des secours... n'est pas abordé. Ce n'est pas pour me gêner mais il faut le savoir. D'autres ouvrages généralistes présentent la suite des évènements.Pourtant l'ensemble est sérieux et fondé.

Fred's work in this book is a must have for every LBH enthusiast.