--- product_id: 5232938 title: "Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942 (The Pacific War Trilogy, 1)" price: "€ 63.38" currency: EUR in_stock: true reviews_count: 13 url: https://www.desertcart.gr/products/5232938-pacific-crucible-war-at-sea-in-the-pacific-1941-1942 store_origin: GR region: Greece --- # Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942 (The Pacific War Trilogy, 1) **Price:** € 63.38 **Availability:** ✅ In Stock ## Quick Answers - **What is this?** Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942 (The Pacific War Trilogy, 1) - **How much does it cost?** € 63.38 with free shipping - **Is it available?** Yes, in stock and ready to ship - **Where can I buy it?** [www.desertcart.gr](https://www.desertcart.gr/products/5232938-pacific-crucible-war-at-sea-in-the-pacific-1941-1942) ## Best For - Customers looking for quality international products ## Why This Product - Free international shipping included - Worldwide delivery with tracking - 15-day hassle-free returns ## Description Winner of the Northern California Book Award for Nonfiction "Both a serious work of history…and a marvelously readable dramatic narrative." ― San Francisco Chronicle On the first Sunday in December 1941, an armada of Japanese warplanes appeared suddenly over Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and devastated the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Six months later, in a sea fight north of the tiny atoll of Midway, four Japanese aircraft carriers were sent into the abyss, a blow that destroyed the offensive power of their fleet. Pacific Crucible ―through a dramatic narrative relying predominantly on primary sources and eyewitness accounts of heroism and sacrifice from both navies―tells the epic tale of these first searing months of the Pacific war, when the U.S. Navy shook off the worst defeat in American military history to seize the strategic initiative. 24 pages of illustrations; 12 maps Review: weaves it all together in a well-ordered story - Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942. Ian W. Toll. 2011. Kindle ed. Writing this book was a massive undertaking and it is very well done. Toll used a vast number of sources but weaves it all together in a well-ordered story. He had to make choices, what to include, what to leave out, and he made the choices well. Reading the first pages, I thought it started out slow, with stuff about life at the Naval Academy, the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on naval strategic thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and Theodore Roosevelt. Then Toll jumps to Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. No mention of Japan’s invasion of China and Korea, the war in Europe, the ban on steel and oil exports to Japan, or Japan’s planning of the attack. Nothing on the failure of radar operators to recognize the attack. Toll focuses on the reactions of people in Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, and the White house. There are grizzly details of the wounded sailors. There are fine details of FDR’s study, how he began the afternoon, how the admirals, generals, and Eleanor were reacting. There are other books that give many more details about the Day of Infamy. Soon after the Pearl Harbor attack, Churchill arrived at the White House for a three-week visit, which Toll describes in great detail. Churchill’s overriding goal was to get Roosevelt committed to the war and victory. They worked out arrangements for how the Pacific war would be run by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCOS. Toll tells a lot about Admiral King. He is kinder to King than some historians. After the excitement of the Pearl Harbor attack, Toll backtracks to give many details about Yamamoto, Japan’s relations with the western powers before the war, the rivalry between Japan’s army and navy, and the increase of power of young Japanese officers. FDR ordered Nimitz to go to Oahu and take command, having fired Admiral Kimmel. Nimitz was promoted over many other admirals. He was the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which was the navy’s personnel department. Toll gives good descriptions of Halsey’s attack on Japanese air bases in the Marshall Islands, the Japanese attacks on the Philippines, Singapore, and Java, mistakes made by MacArthur, and the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. The last half of the book is about the Battle of Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, including an excellent description of the intelligence work that broke the Japanese codes and identified the Japanese plan to attack Port Moresby, Midway and Alaska. The description of the Battle of Midway is mostly complete and very engaging with many details. I would have liked to have read more about why Stanhope Ring took the wrong heading and failed to find the enemy fleet, and why the torpedo bombers didn’t get protection from the F4F Wildcats. Maybe there just aren’t answers to those questions. There were two great scandals of the Battle of Midway. The American torpedo bomber attacks were failures, but not for lack of courage of the aircrews. The TBD bombers were slow and outdated, the torpedoes had insufficient range and often did not work, and the TBDs did not have fighter support. The bravery of the TBD crews, in spite of these shortcomings, was spectacular. Almost all of them died trying to attack the Japanese carriers. They contributed to the victory by keeping the Zeros and carriers occupied and distracted until the SBD dive bombers came in to kill the carriers. The other scandal is how Commander Joseph Rochefort was treated after the battle. He was in charge of Hypo, the Combat Intelligence Unit for the Pacific Command. Without his work on decoding messages, the battle would have been vastly different. After the battle, Captain John R. Redman and his elder brother, Rear Adm Joseph R. Redman, managed to take credit for the intelligence coup and to punish Rochefort for proving them to be wrong. In the weeks before the Battle of Midway, the Redmans disagreed with Rochefort’s assessments and opposed Nimitz’ plan to ambush the Japanese at Midway. John Redman was chief of OP-20-G, the Washington-based Navy Radio Intelligence Section. Joseph Redman was director of naval communications. Joseph Redman was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Rochefort was denied his and was recalled to Washington to waste his talents. I highly recommend this book and I am eager to read the other two volumes by Toll. It is better than Shattered Sword or Miracle at Midway, and about equal to Incredible Victory. Review: Great history book - History the way it should be written. As much time is spent from the Japanese point of view as the American so you really get a full picture of what is going on during the period covered by the book. It reads like a novel, well written and researched with copious footnotes. I look forward to the remaining books in the series. ## Features - Used Book in Good Condition ## Technical Specifications | Specification | Value | |---------------|-------| | Best Sellers Rank | #27,591 in Books ( See Top 100 in Books ) #5 in Naval Military History #43 in American Military History #47 in World War II History (Books) | | Customer Reviews | 4.8 out of 5 stars 7,125 Reviews | ## Images ![Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942 (The Pacific War Trilogy, 1) - Image 1](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/61fGNlNCZQL.jpg) ## Available Options This product comes in different **Media Language, Media Format** options. ## Customer Reviews ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ weaves it all together in a well-ordered story *by S***G on August 7, 2025* Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942. Ian W. Toll. 2011. Kindle ed. Writing this book was a massive undertaking and it is very well done. Toll used a vast number of sources but weaves it all together in a well-ordered story. He had to make choices, what to include, what to leave out, and he made the choices well. Reading the first pages, I thought it started out slow, with stuff about life at the Naval Academy, the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on naval strategic thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and Theodore Roosevelt. Then Toll jumps to Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. No mention of Japan’s invasion of China and Korea, the war in Europe, the ban on steel and oil exports to Japan, or Japan’s planning of the attack. Nothing on the failure of radar operators to recognize the attack. Toll focuses on the reactions of people in Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, and the White house. There are grizzly details of the wounded sailors. There are fine details of FDR’s study, how he began the afternoon, how the admirals, generals, and Eleanor were reacting. There are other books that give many more details about the Day of Infamy. Soon after the Pearl Harbor attack, Churchill arrived at the White House for a three-week visit, which Toll describes in great detail. Churchill’s overriding goal was to get Roosevelt committed to the war and victory. They worked out arrangements for how the Pacific war would be run by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCOS. Toll tells a lot about Admiral King. He is kinder to King than some historians. After the excitement of the Pearl Harbor attack, Toll backtracks to give many details about Yamamoto, Japan’s relations with the western powers before the war, the rivalry between Japan’s army and navy, and the increase of power of young Japanese officers. FDR ordered Nimitz to go to Oahu and take command, having fired Admiral Kimmel. Nimitz was promoted over many other admirals. He was the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which was the navy’s personnel department. Toll gives good descriptions of Halsey’s attack on Japanese air bases in the Marshall Islands, the Japanese attacks on the Philippines, Singapore, and Java, mistakes made by MacArthur, and the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. The last half of the book is about the Battle of Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, including an excellent description of the intelligence work that broke the Japanese codes and identified the Japanese plan to attack Port Moresby, Midway and Alaska. The description of the Battle of Midway is mostly complete and very engaging with many details. I would have liked to have read more about why Stanhope Ring took the wrong heading and failed to find the enemy fleet, and why the torpedo bombers didn’t get protection from the F4F Wildcats. Maybe there just aren’t answers to those questions. There were two great scandals of the Battle of Midway. The American torpedo bomber attacks were failures, but not for lack of courage of the aircrews. The TBD bombers were slow and outdated, the torpedoes had insufficient range and often did not work, and the TBDs did not have fighter support. The bravery of the TBD crews, in spite of these shortcomings, was spectacular. Almost all of them died trying to attack the Japanese carriers. They contributed to the victory by keeping the Zeros and carriers occupied and distracted until the SBD dive bombers came in to kill the carriers. The other scandal is how Commander Joseph Rochefort was treated after the battle. He was in charge of Hypo, the Combat Intelligence Unit for the Pacific Command. Without his work on decoding messages, the battle would have been vastly different. After the battle, Captain John R. Redman and his elder brother, Rear Adm Joseph R. Redman, managed to take credit for the intelligence coup and to punish Rochefort for proving them to be wrong. In the weeks before the Battle of Midway, the Redmans disagreed with Rochefort’s assessments and opposed Nimitz’ plan to ambush the Japanese at Midway. John Redman was chief of OP-20-G, the Washington-based Navy Radio Intelligence Section. Joseph Redman was director of naval communications. Joseph Redman was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Rochefort was denied his and was recalled to Washington to waste his talents. I highly recommend this book and I am eager to read the other two volumes by Toll. It is better than Shattered Sword or Miracle at Midway, and about equal to Incredible Victory. ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Great history book *by D***D on August 10, 2026* History the way it should be written. As much time is spent from the Japanese point of view as the American so you really get a full picture of what is going on during the period covered by the book. It reads like a novel, well written and researched with copious footnotes. I look forward to the remaining books in the series. ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ It’s About Time the Pacific War Gets More Attention *by M***R on March 9, 2016* I so thoroughly enjoyed Mr Toll’s second volume in this series that I decided to read his first installment and I am very glad I did! Many good reviews have been written so instead of a review I would like to indulge in a little critique but I would like to make clear that just because Mr Toll did not fashion his story to include a few things that I think important and just because he indulges in a theme that I think is a red herring does not detract from his wonderful narrative. The red herring theme is not really a very important part of the overall story. The author makes reference a few times to a supposed rivalry or competition between naval air and the battleship folks. It comes across as if the “black shoe” navy did not really trust that aircraft could make any meaningful impact in war. On page 57 (paperback) he says: “The fate of Force Z…settled old and bitter arguments. …it was a conceptual triumph within naval circles all over the world for the cause of aviation, and did more than even Pearl Harbor to undermine the power of the Mahanian ‘big gun club.’” There was no power to undermine. The navy, to include the “black shoe” admirals, had fought hard to keep control of its investment in its air wing. They wanted aircraft and the platforms to launch them. In the run up to the attack on Pearl Harbor it was the Japanese carrier fleet that was getting all the attention. President Roosevelt, the War and Navy Departments all were concerned about the tremendous threat posed by the Kido Butai. This was before Pearl Harbor and before the demise of Force Z. The fate of Force Z was a Churchill decision against the advice of his admirals. That those two attacks had a major influence on “the cause of aviation” is a story that has been retold over and over. The thing is, history, facts and naval spending going on in America in the run up to war show that to be wrong. A fiction. A myth. Back in 1940 Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee said, "The modern development of aircraft has demonstrated conclusively that the backbone of the Navy today is the aircraft carrier. The carrier, with destroyers, cruisers and submarines grouped around it[,] is the spearhead of all modern naval task forces." He had just got a massive naval spending bill through the House. It called for 18 Essex Class carriers and the planes to stock them. It is called the Two Ocean Navy Act. Mr Toll mentions that bill but he gets the amount of expenditure wrong. The proposal CNO Admiral Stark delivered to Vinson was for 4 billion but Vinson bumped it to 8 billion. The above quote from Vinson came from the news conference after passage. Reporters wanted him to explain why the government was spending so much money. The government and the navy would not invest so much treasure and resources unless the navy really wanted naval air power and the carriers to launch it. Among other classes of ships, the bill also called for 2 Iowa Class battleships and 5 Montana Class battleships. The US Navy wanted a powerful modern force that would not ignore the battleship but it did want a preponderance of carriers that would be the backbone and spearhead of the modern task force. The navy was committed to air power to be the decisive striking force of the fleet well before that terrible week in December 1941. Since the aircraft carriers, and the six major carrier duels between the US and Japan, had such a tremendous influence on the fighting and the outcome of the Pacific War it would have been nice if the author could have told the reader what the two carrier forces looked like at the start. And, since his narrative refers to the doctrine and influence of Mahan, it would have been nice to get a picture of the battleship fleets of both countries as well. For the sake of taking stock of the US Navy’s actual combat doctrine he should have also investigated the influence of war gaming at the Naval War College and fleet exercises conducted in the 1930’s. The author discussed the importance of Theodor Roosevelt to modernizing the navy in his day but did not mention Carl Vinson once, the man responsible for the navy that won the war in the Pacific. In the epilogue to this fine book the author does a superlative job of summarizing the Battle of Midway and the fate of Joe Rochefort. He does a fine job of illustrating how Rochefort is remembered by historians but does not paint a complete picture of how he is remembered today by his country. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal in 1985, he was posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1986 by Ronald Reagan and he was inducted into the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Hall of Fame in 2000. Then the author continues with the carriers vs battleships theme: “Now [after Midway], somewhat belatedly, the Japanese navy acknowledged the primacy of carriers over battleships and other surface units. Hulls that had originally been laid down as battleships were converted on the stocks to new carriers.” I know of only one battleship that was converted to a carrier after Midway, the Shinano, a Yamato Class battleship. No other battleships or battlecruisers were laid down. There was a plan for a super Yamato Class but those plans did not get very far. Meanwhile the Japanese planned for six Taiho Class carriers, 1 was built, and 15 Unryu Class carriers, three were built. The Unryu Class were laid after Midway. It seems the evidence points to the Japanese really wanting carriers but that does not fit in with the author’s desire to depict a preference for battleships. That said, I think Mr Toll has still produced a richly detailed story that does a great job of examining the issues that influenced Japan’s decision to make war with the US and the events of the first six months of the war. This is, I think, a very necessary contribution to Second World War literature. There are many books covering the war against the Nazis but not so many that cover the war against Japan. A very curious thing about the paperback edition I received: the text is missing the notes citation numbers. I have a nice list of notes in the back of the book but I have to really struggle to figure out which part of the text they refer to. I am considering buying the hardcover. ## Frequently Bought Together - Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942 (The Pacific War Trilogy, 1) - The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944 (The Pacific War Trilogy, 2) --- ## Why Shop on Desertcart? - 🛒 **Trusted by 1.3+ Million Shoppers** — Serving international shoppers since 2016 - 🌍 **Shop Globally** — Access 737+ million products across 21 categories - 💰 **No Hidden Fees** — All customs, duties, and taxes included in the price - 🔄 **15-Day Free Returns** — Hassle-free returns (30 days for PRO members) - 🔒 **Secure Payments** — Trusted payment options with buyer protection - ⭐ **TrustPilot Rated 4.5/5** — Based on 8,000+ happy customer reviews **Shop now:** [https://www.desertcart.gr/products/5232938-pacific-crucible-war-at-sea-in-the-pacific-1941-1942](https://www.desertcart.gr/products/5232938-pacific-crucible-war-at-sea-in-the-pacific-1941-1942) --- *Product available on Desertcart Greece* *Store origin: GR* *Last updated: 2026-10-05*